The recent decision in Wi-Fi One v. Broadcom, has presented an interesting opportunity for the Federal Circuit to reconsider its jurisprudence on the reviewability of the PTO’s institution decision post-Cuozzo and in particular the application of the time bar set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).  The language of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)

Activision Blizzard, Inc. v. Acceleration Bay, Inc. presents an interesting situation emphasizing the limited scope of IPR proceedings and the interplay between PTAB practice and co-pending litigation.  In Activision Blizzard., the Petitioners challenged claims of U.S. Patent 6,920,497, a patent directed to “a method of connecting a seeking computer through a portal computer to

The question of whether PTAB trials are litigation-like or examination-like (or some hybrid of the two) has been implicated on several occasions.  The most recent one is in the In re Aqua en banc hearing Order.  No. 2015-1177 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 2012).  While the PTAB has repeatedly stated it does not examine proposed amended

Daicel Corporation v. Celanese Int’l Corp., No. IPR2015-00171, Paper No. 86 (P.T.A.B. June 23, 2016) sheds important insight on how the Board applies the broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) standard for claim construction, and the application of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence.  In that case, the Board instituted an IPR based on both § 102(b) and

The America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011 ushered in a new era for the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, introducing 3 new post-grant administrative proceedings that are conducted before the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) and appealable to the Federal Circuit.  The proceedings introduced by the AIA include the inter partes