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As discussed in Part I of this article, the scope of IPR estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) remains unclear.  In Part II, we explore several approaches that courts may apply.

Specifically, the approaches considered herein contemplate the meaning of the phrase “reasonably could have raised” in the IPR estoppel statute.  Clearly, Congress did not

When the America Invents Act (“AIA”) first went into effect, it was widely believed by practitioners that the scope of the estoppel provisions under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) was very broad.  Essentially, an IPR petitioner whose petition resulted in a final written determination would be estopped from arguing in district court any §§ 102 and/or

A new § 101 decision provides a little more insight into subject-matter eligibility. In Apple, Inv. v. Ameranth, Inc., Case Nos. 2015-1703, and -1704, the Federal Circuit reviewed decisions in CBM2014-00013, -00015, and -00016 (decision dated November 29, 2016). The CBMs involved subject matter eligibility challenges against the claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,384,850;