Senior U.S. Circuit Judge William Bryson ruled on Monday that all the asserted claims in the six Restasis patents that Allergan PLC (“Allergan”) accused generic-drug manufacturers of infringing were invalid for obviousness.[i] Last month, Allergan transferred the patents for this dry eye drug to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe (“Tribe”) in an endeavor to

Given the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (“PTAB” or “Board”) reluctance to grant motions to amend claims during AIA post-grant proceedings, patent owners faced with post-grant challenges have attempted to circumvent the challenge of amending claims by filing reissue applications of challenged patents.  By doing so, the patent owner attempts to create two parallel proceedings

Just recently, Allergan PLC (“Allergan”) announced that it had transferred the patents for its dry-eye drug Restasis to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe to take advantage of its sovereign immunity status and ward off challenges to the patents. Under the deal, the Tribe received an upfront payment of $13.75 million and will receive $15 million

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) enjoys a wide range of discretion on a number of issues.  For instance, the PTAB has interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) as providing the Director with the discretion to institute or not, regardless of whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner will prevail on at least

A difference between post-grant proceedings (i.e., inter partes review and covered business methods) and its predecessor (i.e., ex parte and inter partes reexaminations) is the ability for parties in post-grant proceedings to settle and request termination of the proceedings.  Both federal statutory authority and USPTO rules govern the nature of settlements

The Federal Circuit recently changed the scope of CBM eligible patents. While the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB) had previously interpreted its jurisdiction broadly, the Federal Circuit, in two recent decisions, considerably narrowed the universe of patents eligible for CBM review. This post analyzes the results of those decisions as they have played out

As discussed in Part I of this article, the scope of IPR estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) remains unclear.  In Part II, we explore several approaches that courts may apply.

Specifically, the approaches considered herein contemplate the meaning of the phrase “reasonably could have raised” in the IPR estoppel statute.  Clearly, Congress did not